Collectivism and the Intellectuals: Svend Ranulf, Emile Durkheim, Fascism, and Resistance by Smith, David N.
305
Antisemitism Studies Vol. 1, No. 2 • DOI 10.2979/antistud.1.2.04 
Copyright © Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism
Collectivism and the Intellectuals
Svend Ranulf, Émile Durkheim, Fascism, 
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DaviD NormaN Smith
Ideals of collective solidarity and community are often affirmed by authoritar-
ians as well as by democrats. That double fact has seemed paradoxical to many 
thinkers, some of whom conclude, or suspect, that the pursuit of collective initiatives 
and solidarities is reactionary in principle. The fact that Nazi Germany sought to 
revive the Volksgemeinschaft (folk community) has fueled this suspicion. One con-
sequence has been that thinkers whose views are regarded as collectivist have often 
been charged with setting the stage for fascism. Accusing fingers are often pointed 
at philosophers (Hegel, Schopenhauer) and sociologists (Weber, Durkheim). Lately, 
a subterranean current of accusations against Émile Durkheim in particular 
has gained renewed attention. Charges by Svend Ranulf and Marcel Déat in the 
prewar era have been resuscitated. But closely examined, the views of Ranulf, Déat, 
and their latter-day successors reveal deep confusion about democracy, solidarity, 
community, fascism, and resistance to fascism.
Solidarity and community are prized in most democratic circles. But the 
dangers of communitarian excess have been widely recognized in the 
years since the Dreyfus Affair gave Europe a foretaste of the reaction-
ary horrors to come on the eve of the 20th century. Individualism was 
now invidiously contrasted to ethnic unity, and democracy was suddenly 
an object of fierce derision. Émile Durkheim, the pioneer of French 
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sociology and a passionate defender of the persecuted Dreyfus, was 
among the first to explore and challenge this anti-democratism.1
In Le suicide, which appeared in 1897 at the height of the Dreyfus 
Affair, Durkheim argued that society was now suspended between 
dangerous moral extremes—excessive egoism, on the one hand, and 
excessive “altruism,” on the other. The latter, which he defined as the 
morbidly extreme dominance of the group over the individual, entailed 
the loss of self, the sacrifice of individuality. Until the modern era, such 
over-integration had been normal. But now it had become a reaction-
ary choice, reflecting a wish to tighten society’s loosening ties. This 
wish was found, most markedly, in the military—the very institution 
which, in the Dreyfus Affair, had made itself the prime locus of French 
chauvinism.2
In other publications of the period, Durkheim criticized antisem-
itism (which he said was fueled by the wish for expiatory sacrifices) 
and came to the defense of individualism and moral autonomy against 
Brunetière and others.3 He believed that society needed solidarity to 
flourish; but solidarity itself could be unhealthy. As he explained in the 
final chapter of Suicide, and in the foreword to the second edition of 
De la division du travail social, society needed new, balanced forms of 
solidarity. His hope was that “professional life,” in the workplace and in 
the wider sphere of vocational interests, would enable society to steer 
a course between the Scylla of unbridled egoism and the Charybdis of 
over-integration. Just as the workplace had spurred working-class syn-
dicalism, so might it provide a platform for new forms of communal life 
which would draw their strength from shared personal interests, rather 
than stifling individuality.4
In the early years of the twentieth-century, as his influence grew 
at the Sorbonne and elsewhere, Durkheim also became increasingly 
controversial. On the reactionary and monarchist right, he was an ever 
more prominent symbol of liberal decadence. Antisemitic writers, in 
particular, singled him out as a menace to virtue—a kind of Dreyfus 
of the academy. Durkheim, unbowed, turned in his tremendous final 
work, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912), to the theme of 
“collective effervescence.” This is the energy of group assembly, which 
“dynamogenically” lifts the group’s members to peaks of vision and 
morale they could not otherwise attain.5 So intense is the experience of 
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assembly that, in the heat of the moment, people transcend their usual 
sense of limited personal agency. They either scale heights of collective 
inspiration (á la August 4, 1789) or sink to debased collective depths 
(as in the vindictive Boulangiste chauvinism of 1889, which Durkheim 
felt presaged the Dreyfus Affair).6
In 1915, Durkheim published an incisive critique of the mentality 
which German nationalists had displayed en route to the Great War. This 
mentality, he contended, combined the worst of both worlds—soaring 
national egoism and the surrender of individual will to an autocratic 
state. Critics have sometimes accused Durkheim of indulging in patri-
otic propaganda thinly disguised as scholarship, but in reality his analysis 
is clinically accurate—and quite mild, in light of what the world was 
later to learn about German chauvinism in the course and aftermath of 
the Second World War.7
Many elements of a potential sociology of fascism appear in these 
texts. Durkheim was keenly aware of the temptations of radical collec-
tivism, and, in the concepts of effervescence and altruism he offered 
indispensable starting points for critique. Anyone who reads Robert 
Brasillach’s joyous apology for the Nuremberg rallies will see Durkheim’s 
concepts brought to life.8 So too will anyone who reads Aurel Kolnai’s 
underappreciated masterpiece on Nazi ideology.9 Unlike the crowd psy-
chologists—Le Bon, Sighele, Bernheim, Freud—Durkheim sought the 
roots of politics and prejudice not in the peregrinations of “Great Men” 
but in society itself. This gave his sociology a foundation without which 
insight into authentically mass phenomena would have been debarred.
Gabriel Tarde, who offered a variant of crowd psychology as an 
alternative to Durkheimian sociology, attempted to explain mass phe-
nomena by the principle of imitation. Society, he believed, is divided 
between inventors and imitators, so if we seek to explain a social 
movement we should not look past the character of the leader. Know 
the shepherd, and you will know the sheep. In 1898, Tarde applied 
this principle to emerging mass antisemitism. The modern crowd, he 
argued, is moved not simply by the power of demagogic speech but 
above all by printed speech. The master publicist is the demiurge of the 
anonymous mass.
Of course, Tarde says, one could argue, with “a specious appear-
ance of reason,” that the ultimate impetus for public action comes from 
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the public itself, and that the publicist who seeks influence must appeal 
to the public’s pre-existing wishes. “But who can deny,” he demands, 
“that every public has its inspirateur, and occasionally its creator? What 
Sainte-Beuve said of genius, that ‘the genius is a king who creates his 
people,’ is especially true of the great journalist. How often we see pub-
licists create their own public!”10 With respect to the mass anti-Jewish 
feeling that flowered in France in the aftermath of the Paris bourse crash 
of 1882, Tarde underlined the role played by the pandering journalist 
Edouard Drumont. Of course, he agreed, “for Edouard Drumont to 
give life to antisemitism,” he had to take the public’s “state of mind” into 
account. But “until his resounding voice was raised,” there was literally 
no mass antisemitism. It was Drumont alone who made anti-Jewish bias 
conscious, strong and “contagious.” “He who expressed it created it as 
a collective force . . .”11
This, the mass psychology of antisemitism, remains influential in 
many forms. Mass sentiment is blamed either on charismatic leaders, 
who “mesmerize” their followers, or on compelling situations, á la the 
Stanford Prison experiment.12 Durkheim, in striking contrast, focuses on 
multiple sources of causation—norms, culture, population—of which 
leadership is only one, and seldom, if ever, decisive in the long run. He 
thus points the causal arrow in the other direction, saying that the publi-
cist’s success or failure depends on the pre-existing character of the pub-
lic. “In Melanesia and Polynesia,” he wrote in Les formes élémentaires, 
“it is said that an influential man has mana, and that we can impute his 
influence to this mana. It is apparent, however, that his unique status 
comes from the significance that opinion gives him.”13
Know the followers, and you will know the leader.14 A similar con-
clusion was reached by the German socialist and sociologist Theodor 
Geiger in 1926: “The typical leader of a crowd is not a ‘demagogue,’ he 
does not consciously and coldly lead the crowd in a certain direction, 
but is rather himself affected the most by the ecstasy of the crowd expe-
rience, is himself the most unconscious person.”15
Curiously, Émile Durkheim himself has been charged recently 
with an appreciable degree of inadvertent responsibility for the success 
of fascism. The implication, it seems, is that Durkheim, like Drumont, 
has been a publicist for reaction, even if this was not his intent. Is there 
in fact any merit to this charge? Is Émile Durkheim one of the sources 
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of what Wilhelm Reich called “the mass psychology of fascism”?16 Was 
Durkheim an “inspirateur,” a “creator,” of hate?
Twins separaTed aT birTh?
It has been common to trace the ideological ancestry of communism 
and fascism to eminent inspirateurs ever since the revolution of 1917 
brought Lenin to power and the counter-revolutions of 1922 and 1933 
did the same for Mussolini and Hitler. Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Sorel are among the most often-cited figures. In the postwar era, when 
academic sociology solidified and Weber and Durkheim joined Marx 
in the pantheon of major social theorists, they too have increasingly 
become magnets for liberal suspicion.
Marx, of course, has been the subject of entire libraries of denun-
ciation. One of the most extreme charges against him is the claim that, 
by calling for the abolition of capitalism—and hence, of the capitalist 
class—Marx was a conscious proponent of genocide, however much he 
may have said that he hoped for change by peaceful means.17 Other 
familiar charges include accusations of totalitarian and antisemitic intent.
Similar accusations have been made against Weber. At first, under 
the galvanizing influence of Wolfgang Mommsen, Weber’s critics 
focused mainly on his theory of charismatic authority, which they said 
prefigured Hitlerian claims to domination.18 But more recently, thanks 
especially to Gary Abraham, Weber has also been charged with a subtle 
form of anti-Jewish bias.19
For many years, Durkheim escaped this kind of infamy. Occasional 
slivers of doubt and accusation had appeared in print as early as the 
1930s, but they were little noticed.20 Lately, however, these accusations 
have been given fresh attention and emphasis by two authors in particu-
lar: Michele Battini, who has argued that Marcel Déat’s transition from 
socialism to fascism in the years culminating in the Nazi occupation of 
France was due largely to Durkheimian influence; and Marcel Stoetzler, 
who has revived charges against Durkheim that were first advanced in 
1939 by the Danish philosopher Svend Ranulf.21 The essence of Ranulf’s 
charges were recapitulated by Stephen Turner in 1992 in a passage cited 
by Stoetzler: “There are many very direct connections between fascist 
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ideas and early sociology. . . . The romantic notion of reweaving a social 
order destroyed by impersonality, shared by Tönnies, Durkheim [and] 
others . . . contributed, however indirectly, to the climate of opinion in 
which fascism took hold.”22 He also cites Ranulf directly. Durkheim’s 
sociology, Ranulf wrote, “served to prepare the soil for fascism by their 
propagation of the view that the society in which they were living was 
headed for disaster because of its individualism and liberalism and that 
a new social solidarity was badly needed.”23 Though this was not what 
he consciously sought to promote, Durkheim’s contribution to fascist 
thought is, in effect, his guilty secret, the inner truth of his sociology.24
His goal, Stoetzler writes, is “to complicate and develop Ranulf ’s 
thesis,” especially with respect to Durkheim and antisemitism.25 This 
leads him to offer several corollary claims, which I will consider later, 
along with Battini’s argument about Déat. But first I will explore 
Ranulf ’s thesis directly. Until now, that thesis has received only glanc-
ing discussion. Stoetzler finds this distressing, lamenting that, to date, 
“Ranulf ’s intervention . . . has not enjoyed any lasting influence.”26 
The question, then, is whether this intervention in fact merits such 
influence.
ranulf The anTi-durkheim
Durkheim has often been misread. One misreading in particular, that 
he denied the importance of individuality, became so persistent that he 
was forced to disavow it repeatedly, for decades—to no avail. Resisting 
this meme, he said, was like “slashing at water with a knife.”27 And that 
meme is one of the basic premises for Ranulf’s charge of fascism.
Does Ranulf’s charge deserve lasting influence? The short answer 
is no. Of the seven pages he devotes to Durkheim in his 1939 arti-
cle, he spends just six sentences arguing that his sociology has fascist 
tendencies. Those sentences are not competent, and they have not yet 
been carefully dissected by Durkheimian scholars.28 But they deserve 
our attention because they exert a kind of spectral, reputational influ-
ence. The smoke of Ranulf’s allegations implies the presence of fire in 
Durkheim’s thought. That implication, in my opinion, is demonstrably 
untenable.29
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To begin at the beginning. Svend Ranulf (1894–1953), who had 
studied briefly with Durkheim’s nephew Marcel Mauss, dedicated his 
early career to the study of ancient Greek law. He argued, in his dis-
sertation and in The Jealousy of the Gods, that moral indignation is the 
mainspring of reactionary modern politics as well as archaic punitive 
law.30 He equated this indignation with ressentiment, as defined by the 
Catholic social philosopher Max Scheler,31 and he regarded it as the 
denominator common to every movement of the angst-riddled “petty 
bourgeoisie” (which he defined so elastically that it included Stalin’s 
bureaucracy in the 1930s).32 He pursued this thesis, and a quixotic wish 
to purge sociology of everything save positivism, with dogged tenacity. 
He was thus disturbed by Durkheim’s thesis, in De la division du travail 
social, that punitive, outrage-fueled law is being displaced by dispas-
sionate “restitution” and rehabilitation. He found this liberal optimism 
dissonant, and hence, when he pivoted from Tönnies to Durkheim in 
his essay on fascism, he devoted most of his attention to the nettlesome 
question of restitutive law. Even this he treated briefly.33 But it would 
be hard to be more cursory than his ensuing six sentences, in which he 
casually accuses Durkheim of having an elective affinity for fascism.34
The following six sentences comprise the whole of Svend Ranulf’s 
“intervention” with respect to Durkheim and fascism: 1) “In a Preface 
to the second edition of De la division du travail sociale Durkheim 
describes a revivification of the professional corporations, as a necessary 
prerequisite for the creation of the new social solidarity of which he is 
in quest”; 2) “This is what he thinks his scientific investigations have 
helped him to foresee and what it is, therefore, his practical duty to fur-
ther as a remedy against the state of anarchy from which contemporary 
society is suffering.” These two sentences complete Ranulf’s remarks 
on what I call Durkheim’s “guild sociology”—that is, his argument that 
new forms of solidarity are possible in professional groups and work-
places.35 The next four sentences concern Les formes élémentaires de la 
vie religieuse: 3) “But instead of writing the book which it had been 
his intention to devote to this subject, [he] describes in his last great 
work, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, an ideal of social life 
which is located in the past and would seem to have no very hopeful 
prospect of a resurrection in the future”; 4) “He finds this ideal realized 
in the native Australian communities which are as yet unaffected by the 
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disastrous individualism and egotism of modern civilization”; 5) “The 
Australian religious festivals, the relationship of which to modern mass 
phenomena is indicated, are described as the indispensable means to 
prevent the societies in question from falling to pieces”36; and, 6) “It is 
stated that modern civilization suffers from the absence of some equiv-
alent institution, and a hope is expressed that this defect will be rem-
edied in the future, but Durkheim does not now undertake to predict 
anything about the form of the institutions which may be expected to 
effect that salvation.”37
Besides these sentences, Ranulf cites passages from two private let-
ters he had received from Marcel Mauss. On November 6, 1936, Mauss 
had written that the fact that “great modern societies . . . could be sub-
ject to suggestion as Australians are by their dances, and made to turn 
around like children in a ring, is not something we had really foreseen.” 
Thirty months later, on May 8, 1939, he wrote “this is all a real tragedy 
for us, an unwelcome verification of the things we had been suggest-
ing and the proof that we should perhaps have expected verification in 
the bad case rather than a verification in the good.” Some critics have 
echoed Ranulf’s conclusion that these letters show that Mauss “acqui-
esced” to the charge of prefiguring fascism.38 But there is no evidence 
to suggest that Mauss suspected that his former student would levy this 
charge against him.
As it happens, as we know from Deutschland über alles, Durkheim 
was acutely aware of the “morbid enormity” and cancerous potential 
of German hyper-nationalism, which he saw as a uniquely grave dan-
ger.39 Durkheim was relentlessly opposed to the Tardean premise, 
echoed uncritically by Mauss, that leaders rule by “suggestion.”40 And 
even if we were to agree that Durkheim did not fully foresee fascism, 
or that he valued positive forms of effervescent assembly, that would 
not mean that his sociology was proto-fascist or that he encouraged 
“bad cases” of effervescent assembly (which he had long called “morbid 
effervescence”).41
Ranulf rests his case against Durkheim on a single paragraph. On 
the strength of that paragraph, he poses a remarkably casual question, 
which, as we saw above, Stoetzler quotes with apparent approval: “Is 
not the rise of fascism an event which, in due logic, Durkheim ought 
to have welcomed as that salvation from individualism for which he had 
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been trying rather gropingly to prepare the way?” Without pause (or, it 
seems, reflection), he answers blandly: “In due logic, undoubtedly.”42 
What that “due logic” may be remains unspoken.
In all, Ranulf has offered just four claims: 1) Durkheim favors 
revived forms of professional solidarity as a remedy for social anarchy; 
2) His “ideal of social life” entails the kind of freedom from egoism
that once typified Australian cultures; 3) Effervescent collective rituals
are indispensable to solidarity; so that, 4) we need similar rituals now.
And to defend these propositions he offers just a few ambiguous lines
of Maussian chagrin about the “tragedy” of Nazi suggestion and a few
cryptic references to two of Durkheim’s texts. Since Durkheim did not
in fact idealize Australian ritualism, which he regarded as ecstatic, orgi-
astic, and fetishistic, and since he favored the kind of professional and
fraternal assembly that would bind people together as mutually respon-
sible colleagues and citizens, Ranulf’s case for Durkheim’s “undoubted”
affinity for fascism rests exclusively on the claim that he favored profes-
sional solidarity over anarchy.43 That, plainly, is a very weak reed for a
major and counter-intuitive claim.
effervescence “sublime or savage”
Later in this article, I will examine in more detail the argument that 
Durkheim puts forward in favor of professional guilds. But first, it is 
ápropos to review the key page cited by Ranulf from Les formes élé-
mentaires. This shows that Mauss as well as Ranulf had failed to read 
Durkheim carefully or to recall exactly what he said. “In the midst of an 
assembly animated by a common passion,” Durkheim writes:
we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are 
incapable when reduced to our own forces; and when the assembly 
is dissolved and when, finding ourselves alone again, we fall back 
to our ordinary level, we are then able to measure the height to 
which we have been raised above ourselves. History abounds in 
examples of this sort. It suffices to think of the night of August 
4th, [1789], when an assembly was suddenly led to an act of 
sacrifice and abnegation which each of its members had refused 
the day before and which surprised them all the day after. This is 
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why all political, economic and confessional parties take care to 
hold periodic reunions so that their members can revivify their 
communal faith by manifesting it in common. To reinforce those 
sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon wilt, it suffices 
to reunite those who share them and to link them more closely 
and actively.44
Up to this point Durkheim’s analysis might appear to contain a hint 
of enthusiasm. Collective assembly raises us to heights of self-sacrifice. 
Borne aloft on currents of collective energy, we find ourselves elevated 
to a plane of common passion. But in his ensuing lines, Durkheim 
shows keen awareness of the demagogic possibilities opened up by pas-
sion commune:
We see here what explains the unique attitude of the man who 
speaks to a crowd [and] successfully enters into communion 
with it. His language has a grandiloquence that would ordinarily 
appear ridiculous; his gestures are domineering; his very thought 
is impatient of all rules, and easily falls into all sorts of excesses. 
This is because he feels within him an abnormal plethora of forces 
that overflow and expand beyond him; sometimes he even has the 
feeling that he is dominated by a moral force that surpasses him 
and of which he is only the interpreter. It is by this trait that we 
recognize what is often called the demon of oratorical inspiration.45
Durkheim knows that this demon can be anything but benign. At 
moments of “great collective shock” people assemble more than ever,” 
producing the kind of:
general effervescence . . . typical of revolutionary or creative 
epochs . . . one sees more and differently than in normal times. 
These changes are not only of shades and degrees; men become 
different. The passions that agitate them are so intense that they 
can be satisfied only by violent, excessive acts, acts of superhuman 
heroism or bloody barbarism. This is what explains, e.g., the 
Crusades and many of the scenes, whether sublime or savage, of the 
French Revolution. Under the influence of the general exaltation, 
we see the most mediocre and inoffensive bourgeois become either 
a hero or a hangman.46 
Clearly, Durkheim knew the dangers of mass demagoguery and 
assembly. He had witnessed Boulangism and the Dreyfus Affair. He 
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would soon witness the morbid excesses of German chauvinism. If he 
had lived to see Kristallnacht in 1938—he would have been 80—would 
he have been speechless as well as aghast? That seems less than likely. 
He knew that cities and factories provide unique venues for assembly, 
and that demographic concentration is far more conducive to rebellion 
and riot than dispersion. He absolutely did believe that some forms of 
assembly and effervescent collectivity are positive. But he knew the dif-
ference between morbid and healthy effervescence, between voluntary 
professional guilds and authoritarian leagues. Ranulf, like his co-thinkers 
and successors, found this difference hard to grasp.
roads To reacTion
The premises underlying Ranulf’s reliance on an unexplained “due 
logic” appear not in his sketchy claims or evidence but, rather, in his 
defense of market individualism. When he notes, with casual condescen-
sion, that “aspects of fascism . . . would probably have seemed unaccept-
able to Durkheim,” he suggests hopefully that discomfort with these 
“aspects” among Durkheim’s successors might “induce a reconsider-
ation of the whole view of nineteenth-century individualism as a thing 
to be deprecated.”47 His tacit neoliberalism comes to the fore when, in 
his effort to blame fascism on the wish to replace egoistic market soci-
ety (Gesellschaft) with face-to-face community (Gemeinschaft), Ranulf 
concludes with uncharacteristic vehemence: “indulgence in . . . depre-
cations of the Gesellschaft is equivalent to a piece of fascist propaganda 
unsupported by genuine science.”48
Ranulf, in a phrase, is a free-market liberal. He opposed, and dep-
recated, all currents of thought, socialist or sociological, which chal-
lenged market society. That became clear in the late 1930s when he 
histrionically criticized his chief rival for the first university appoint-
ment in Danish sociology, the exiled German Social Democrat Theodor 
Geiger, who, like Tönnies, was a sociologist of Gemeinschaft.49 The same 
attitude was implicit in 1939 when Ranulf protested that Durkheim 
had not “proven” his claim that “the economic anarchy and inequal-
ity of capitalism are responsible for the lack of solidarity now prevail-
ing.”50 His neoliberal standpoint became even plainer when, in 1948, 
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he published an anthology in which, alongside a revision of his 1939 
essay,51 he wrote in defense of Friedrich Hayek and against the alleged 
excesses of the Danish resistance to Nazi occupation.52
Friedrich Hayek established himself as the ultimate neoliberal in 
1944 with the publication of The Road to Serfdom.53 Ranulf, four years 
later, pointed out that “Hayek’s theory that socialism leads inevitably 
to Nazism” meant that democratic socialism can only be an oxymoron. 
Hayek’s position was therefore welcomed by the business community 
(in the United States) but opposed by leftist critics like Herman Finer.54 
Finer stressed that actual Italian socialists had always hated Mussolini.55 
But Ranulf says that Finer “entirely” misses Hayek’s point. Echoing his 
prewar criticism of Durkheim and Tönnies, Ranulf explained to Hayek’s 
critics that the road to serfdom is paved with good intentions: “didn’t 
it ever happen before that generous and humanitarian people pursued a 
policy which led to results unexpected by themselves?”56
Socialists, like sociologists, may place themselves on the side of the 
angels. But their resistance to laissez faire capitalism places them on the 
wrong side of the law of unintended consequences. Fascism, not dem-
ocratic socialism, is the only actual alternative to market Gesellschaft. 
So social reformers who seek to revive lost forms of solidarity or invent 
new ones are dangerous. They encourage vain populist hopes that can 
only lead the masses astray. Modern forms of serfdom, whether fascist or 
“socialist,” are the inevitable destiny of untethered populism.
This was a view that Ranulf had long entertained. Writing about 
Nazism and atrocity propaganda in 1936 in a Danish journal, Ranulf 
had criticized Geiger for saying that politicians must court and honor 
public opinion if they hope to win power. On the contrary, Ranulf 
argued, Nazi racism and totalitarianism can be credited to Hitler per-
sonally. Sounding very much like Tarde on Drumont, he concluded that 
the well-spring of punitive indignation may have predisposed the masses 
to take the Nazis seriously, but that Hitler and Goebbels were respon-
sible for their embrace of specifically anti-democratic and antisemitic 
views. “It seems necessary to assume that the attitude of the Mass on 
such questions depends not on its immanent nature, but on the propa-
ganda to which it is exposed.”57
A similar fear of propaganda and populism led Hayek to advocate 
a rule-bound, delimited democracy. Ranulf was incensed to learn that 
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Finer found this obnoxious: “Although Hayek’s whole book is meant 
as a weapon for the defence of democracy against the threat of Fascism, 
he does not avoid being accused by Finer of anti-democratic and Fascist 
tendencies. . . . Finer does not see that what Hayek is trying to do 
is prevent democracy from committing suicide.” Democracy would be 
weakened, not empowered, if society were always to defer to the pub-
lic’s passing whims.58
The irony here is palpable. Best known for his charges against 
Durkheim, Ranulf is appalled when Finer makes similar charges against 
Hayek. By this point, with the war behind him, Ranulf had become less 
casual about charges of fascism. But he remained uncertain, and uneasy, 
about populism and Gemeinschaft. Mass outrage and utopian hope con-
tinued to worry him, and he was reluctant to back down from his earlier 
conclusions, but he was also less confident about those conclusions. As 
a result, he vacillated. In his essay on the Danish resistance, he raised 
the stakes by advancing an argument that he knew would infuriate a 
great many people. But in the next breath, he wavered, and came close 
to reversing his position on politics and sociology altogether. How this 
happened is instructive.
resisTance To resisTance
Nothing testifies more to the shakiness of Ranulf’s grasp of fascism and 
anti-fascism than his quirky, tone-deaf criticism of the Danish resistance 
to Nazi occupation and the Nazi Holocaust. The resistance has been 
widely acclaimed for its uniquely resolute and effective resistance to 
the murder of Danish Jews.59 But incredibly, for Ranulf, the resistance 
was analogous to Nazism itself. This rather astonishing interpretation 
reflects the persistence of Ranulf’s hostility to “moral indignation” in all 
its forms. He simply could not tell the difference between moral outrage 
driven by authoritarian hate and moral indignation against authoritarian 
hate.
As far as Ranulf could tell (and indeed, as he insisted), defensive 
violence was simply aggressive violence in disguise. This outlook is made 
vividly clear in his essay, “Nazism as a Resistance Movement,” which 
follows his essay on Hayek. Ranulf knows that he is braving popular 
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opinion: “People who have risked death and torture in the struggle 
against the SS and the Gestapo, when their country was occupied by the 
Germans, will feel outraged at any suggestion of a psychological affinity 
between ourselves and the Nazis.” And yet, he obstinately insists, that 
hypothesis should be “considered objectively and tested carefully . . .”60
What considerations and tests are we offered? Ranulf begins with 
the accounts offered by German Nazis in the 1930s, as reported in 
Theodore Abel’s book, Why Hitler Came Into Power, to explain why they 
had joined the party and why they remained loyal to it.61 He concludes 
from these reports that Nazism was itself a resistance movement. It, too, 
was an indignant reaction to humiliation in war. Stung by the indignity 
of seeing French and Polish troops in the streets after Germany lost the 
war, Abel’s Nazi informants reported aggrieved and aggressive feelings 
that Ranulf argues were “not fundamentally dissimilar to the feelings” 
of Danes who resisted Nazi occupation.62 In support of this startling 
thesis, Ranulf cites these chilling words from an “idealistic” Nazi: “What 
fellowship was there among the men who left their wives, families, and 
parents, preferring the sacred sign of the swastika to their means of live-
lihood! They mocked Hell, death and the Devil in their faith in a just 
cause. What joy and honor to fight side by side with such comrades!”63
He asks, with transcendental innocence: “Can the heroes of the 
resistance movements against the German occupation of other countries 
in Europe fail to recognize their own state of mind in this description 
of the Nazi mentality?”64 He seems to think that this is a truth so plain 
that it can be established by a rhetorical question; that those men and 
women who “risked death and torture in the struggle against the SS 
and the Gestapo” were overjoyed to have the opportunity to leave their 
families, to mock Hell, death and the Devil in a Düreresque holy war 
against the swastika.65
With barely a hint of sociological analysis, Ranulf rests his case on 
what he regards as self-evident similarities of form and feeling. Alluding 
to the ultra-right German death squads which, in the aftermath of 
World War I, committed a series of notorious murders, he writes: “The 
parallel between the Black Reichswehr and the Danish (and other coun-
tries’) resistance movements can hardly be denied.”66 His evidence for 
this remarkable claim? “A parallel to these Fehme murders, as they were 
called, was the execution of informers by the Danish resistance . . .”67
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The perversity of this claim is made clear by the historiography of 
the Danish resistance. On the one hand, much of the resistance focused 
on a truly remarkable effort to shield Danish Jews from mass mur-
der—which was, according to historians, almost uniquely successful.68 
Sabotage, not interpersonal violence, was the most common form of 
resistance, and the movement showed considerable sensitivity to issues 
of ethics, as reflected in this statement by the Danish Freedom Council 
in 1944:
The Nazi-minded persons who have met death in recent times, 
or have been wounded, have not been attacked because of their 
convictions, but solely because they have undertaken, for high pay, 
to track down fellow countrymen who are active in the struggle 
for freedom, and to give them up to the Gestapo. These informers 
have not been put out of action as a punishment, but because they 
have caused the imprisonment of a great many people, and the 
execution of several, and solely to prevent them from endangering 
even more by their continuing activities.69
That the Black Reichswehr killed people in peacetime, in sour 
revenge for an entirely fictitious “stab in the back” during the war; that 
their preferred victims were Jews and socialists; and that the “informers” 
they killed were traitors only to fascism—all that, it seems, is immaterial 
to Ranulf.70 As he sees it, their “feelings” were outraged and they lashed 
out, just like the resistance fighters who opposed them. He concedes 
that “there was no anti-Semitism in the Danish movement” and that, 
despite Communist participation, there was “no animosity towards the 
bourgeoisie as such but only against those who had grown rich because 
of their relations with the Germans.”71 But he hurries past these dif-
ferences to ask, again rhetorically, whether a hypothetical government 
headed by the resistance would truly “have been very different from 
those headed by Hitler or Mussolini? Would there not have been con-
centration camps, arbitrary arrests, and maltreatment of prisoners?”72
Ranulf seems to think that, “in all due logic,” simply asking this 
question suffices to answer it. He does bolster his case with other obser-
vations: that, resistance fighters were occasionally guilty of excesses, for 
example, and that authoritarians in their midst, taking advantage of the 
fog of war, did commit atrocities.73 But his ulterior premise, entirely 
apart from the evidence, is still a function of what he sees as “due 
David Norman Smith
320 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (October 2017)
logic”: that resistance is vicious, not generous; that people fight back 
for the sheer pleasure of venting their outrage, not to defend the weak.
in This TwilighT all caTs are gray
Twelve years earlier, Ranulf had shown a similar inability to tell the dif-
ference between angry wartime rhetoric and antisemitic Nazi extremism, 
arguing that anti-German epithets in the First World War had found a 
peacetime equivalent in Nazi propaganda. An English newspaper had 
called Kaiser Wilhelm “Europe’s mad dog,” Rudyard Kipling had con-
trasted Germans to humans, and French authors called Germany a men-
ace to civilization. Ranulf was able to point to occasional expressions of 
actual demonology, but, in his typical way, he did not carefully distin-
guish between vehemence in the heat of battle and genocidal hatred 
in official doctrinal form.74 He quoted Mein Kampf to the effect that 
Marxists are hyena-like traitors; that Social Democrats are thieves, “ripe 
for the gallows”; that Jews, striving for “world domination” (jediske 
Verdensherredømme), are responsible, with the “Negroid” French, for all 
“pornography, prostitution, and white slavery.”75 And yet he maintains, 
with what seems like a parody of academic detachment, that all such 
departures from “objectivity” belong to the same class.76
It should also be borne in mind that, when Germany occupied 
Denmark, Ranulf was by no means clearly opposed to collusion. His 
resistance to resistance was not entirely theoretical. “The tone in which 
the Nazis spoke of the statesmen of the Weimar Republic,” he con-
tended, “is similar to the tone in which the Danish resistance movement 
spoke of the politicians who wanted to save the country from terror 
by collaborating with the Germans.”77 How such collusion would have 
saved Denmark’s Jews from terror he does not pause to consider. But 
he does consider the plight of those who colluded. “No one could be 
more unlike Hitler than Christmas Møller,” he went on, referring to 
the prewar leader of Danish conservatism, who had opposed the Nazis 
from exile in London: “After the war Christmas Møller did not hesitate 
to squander away his popularity for the sake of maintaining views which 
were the very opposite of those to which Hitler would have adhered 
under similar circumstances: Christmas Møller defied public opinion 
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in order to protect Danish officials and other citizens who were being 
accused of treason because they had loyally followed the instructions of 
their government in their dealings with the Germans . . .”78
Even by Ranulf’s standards, this is a peculiar statement. His impli-
cation, however inadvertent, is that Hitler, like the Danish public, would 
have wanted to punish officials who were loyally following orders. Even 
without the 20–20 clarity of post-Eichmann Trial hindsight, this excuse 
has an unsettling quality. Equally oddly, Ranulf concludes by insisting 
that his interest in outrage and resistance is “purely theoretical” and that, 
in the spirit of value-neutrality, he declines to pass “moral judgments on 
anything or anybody.” And finally, “to forestall misunderstanding,” he 
stresses that, despite their mixed motives, the anti-Nazi resistance move-
ments “deserve the admiration and thankfulness of every one who does 
not want to live under the tyranny of Hitler.”79
This final caveat might sound disingenuous, as if the equivocating 
Danish sociologist wanted to have his cake and eat it too. But Ranulf’s 
mixed feelings appear genuine. This is the clear impression given by his 
revised essay on sociology and Gemeinschaft. Here, less than a decade 
after accusing Durkheim of accidental fascism, he reconsiders—and, in 
part, changes his mind.
The Two souls of communiTy
By now it should be clear that Ranulf is an unreliable guide to fascism 
on any level. His judgments on the moral psychology of fascism and 
its intellectual heritage are not to be trusted. But his emerging equiv-
ocations raise questions of lasting interest and relevance. Under a new, 
Popper-influenced title, “Fascism and the Open Society,” he offers a 
sharply revised version of his 1939 essay, in which all mention of Comte 
vanishes while a new section appears on the Social Democratic legal 
scholar and Weimar-era justice minister Gustav Radbruch. This new 
section amplifies Ranulf’s critique of Social Democracy and those, like 
Herman Finer, who are too eager to abandon market society.80 But 
Ranulf is suddenly less absolute in his criticism of sociology. This new 
hesitancy is especially clear in his ambivalent treatment of two newly dis-
cussed texts, one by Rudolf Heberle (From Democracy to Nazism, 1945), 
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and another by Aurel Kolnai (The War Against the West, 1938).81 Both 
of these authors explain the diametrically opposed ways in which people 
pursue Gemeinschaft—in some instances, in an authoritarian spirit, but in 
other instances with democratic esprit de corps. Ranulf is reluctant to hear 
this, but he is no longer sure that arguments like this are wrong.
Heberle showed that, in Schleswig-Holstein, the wish for 
Gemeinschaft sprang first from circles “far removed from Nazism”—
“pietistic circles and sects” which were anti-war and anti-imperialist. 
“The very notions of bigness and power were rather despised,” Heberle 
noted. “In listening to [their] professions of a new faith in the people, 
one is reminded of Tönnies and Charles Horton Cooley rather than of 
Hitler and Goebbels.”82 But there was also a parallel and contrasting 
“neo-romantic” ideal which “in certain circles,” Heberle writes, “bor-
dered dangerously on anti-Semitism” and was “closely interwoven with 
. . . the longing for charismatic leadership—the daydream of a new iron 
chancellor, a political savior . . .”83 Ranulf found this second tendency 
easier to envision than the first, but he nevertheless showed interest in 
Heberle’s argument that two opposing ideals of Gemeinschaft were in 
question: the “genuine” vision of the early communitarian movements, 
which embraced universal humanity as well as face-to-face community, 
and the warlike, “behavioristic” Nazi ideal of “pseudo-community” in 
which uniformity, attained “by compulsion and training,” resulted in 
“large-scale organization,” “absolute obedience,” and the “oppression 
of all dissenting or antagonistic movements.”84
Ranulf also quotes Kolnai, who showed that Herman Schmalenbach, 
in 1922, expressly contrasted his far-right vision of Gemeinschaft from 
sociological notions á la Tönnies and from ordinary, everyday ideas of 
community. Schmalenbach’s Bund was a third form of Gemeinschaft, 
“deviating essentially” from the other two. Rather than affirming 
humane, grassroots community in everyday life, he offered a vision of 
roving rebel youth who abandon their families in a quest for communal 
conquest, brigandage, and adventure, led by warrior heroes.85
Despite his newfound interest in views like those of Heberle and 
Kolnai, Ranulf attempts to remain critical of Durkheim. This attempt 
takes the form of a diluted argument to the effect that people who are 
influenced by Durkheim “as to the desirability of a moral consensus” 
could still ignore his moral objection to “the impropriety of trying to 
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bring such a consensus about by means of coercion”—so that, despite 
his wish to promote a truly consensual community, he would remain 
an unwitting pro-fascist.86 But Ranulf now pivots radically and begins 
to question his own case against Gemeinschaft. Is it actually true, he 
now asks, that opponents of fascism should always, with Popper, defend 
Gesellschaft against Gemeinschaft? This kind of neoliberal intransigence, 
he realizes, could backfire, since people with communitarian yearnings 
would have no anti-fascist alternative. This leads him to a startling con-
clusion: “So the Social Democrats may, after all, have been well advised 
in . . . adopting the views of Tönnies.”87
Consider carefully what Ranulf is saying here. In a single sen-
tence, he has completely upended his earlier stance. Tönnies and the 
socialists were not proto-fascists but communitarians who offered what 
may have been the needed antidote to fascism. Far from inspiring the 
wish for a National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft, they offered a potential 
alternative.88 Ranulf remains a pessimist. On the heels of the war, he 
harbors few hopes for truly popular democratic Gemeinschaft, and his 
fear of populism has not abated: “the question is whether a Christian 
or a Social Democratic Gemeinschaft would really be able to compete 
with a new brand of Fascism without having recourse to those traits of 
Fascist dictatorship which are commonly considered most objection-
able, such as torture and concentration camps.”89 He sees no obvious 
ways to inspire a sense of humane Gemeinschaft that would match the 
experience of “fanatical fighting against a common enemy.”90 But are 
there better alternatives? Ranulf has none to suggest.
We have thus come full circle. Ranulf began by stigmatizing com-
munitarian criticism of market society, which he called irresponsible, 
and an invitation to fascism. Now, he thinks it may be our best hope of 
keeping fascism at bay. That suggests that Tönnies and Durkheim were 
scholarly forerunners of anti-fascism. 
sociology maligned
When Lucien Lévy-Bruhl died in 1939, Action Française published a 
barbed obituary in which it was said that, influenced “by another Jew, 
Durkheim,” and like other Jews of his day (“he was the cousin of the 
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traitor Dreyfus”), Lévy-Bruhl had helped to make the “pseudo-science” 
of sociology into a spearhead of the liberal crusade to secularize and 
republicanize teaching.91
It would be hard, given this caustic slur, to envision Durkheim and 
Lévy-Bruhl as de facto allies of Action Française or its historical leader, 
Charles Maurras. And yet that was precisely what Marion Mitchell envi-
sioned in 1931 in her article, “Émile Durkheim and the Philosophy of 
Nationalism.”92 Positing the equivalence of Durkheim’s social realism 
with the ultra-nationalism of Action Française (and, to leave no stone 
unturned, with Bolshevism, fascism, and “100% Americanism”), she 
credited Durkheim with a very odd nationalism. It might seem “para-
doxical,” she admitted, to accuse him of jingoistic nationalism, since his 
patriotism was in fact “pacific and humanitarian.” He opposed national 
expansion and advocated decentralization: “in his own mind, the human 
ideal loomed larger than the strictly national.”93 On what ground, then, 
did she assert his chauvinism? On slender grounds indeed.94 She alleged, 
most strikingly, that Durkheim had demonstrated his chauvinism by 
accusing Germany of chauvinism.95
A more realistic insight into Durkheim and Action Française came 
from Pierre Lasserre, who in 1913, when he published an attack on 
Durkheim and “La Barbarie en Sorbonne,”96 was a leading Action 
Française publicist. Lasserre, who in 1909 had called Durkheim a 
“morose Jewish jester” and Lévy-Bruhl a “dangerous Jew-moralist,”97 
was not misled about Durkheim’s true outlook. At first glance, he wrote, 
a naïve reader could think that Durkheim shared the “same sentiments 
that inspired . . . a Drumont, a Barrès, a Maurras . . . ”98 After all, he 
called for improved social cohesion and did not accept the premise that 
individual rights are absolute. “How strange!” Lasserre exclaimed. If 
this were really true, “This Jew would have denied the instinct of his 
race . . . by [seeking] not social dissolution but restoration . . . not anar-
chy, but archy!”99
But alas: “M. Durkheim’s sociology is a trompe-l’oeil,” an illu-
sionist’s trick.100 There was a rumor that he wanted individuals to be 
subordinated to society; but in reality, that goal—the goal of Action 
Française—was antithetical to Durkheim, who wanted community 
within, and bound by, liberal democracy. He sought voluntary unity, the 
professional solidarity of co-workers who find their shared identity not 
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in tradition or ethnicity but in the modern division of labor. So wish-
ful thinkers who think that Durkheim could align himself with “the 
abhorred causes of Roman Catholicism, French patriotism, and Latin 
culture” are in for a rude awakening.101 What he offers under the guise 
of a doctrine of “corporations” (Lasserre here cites the same text that 
Ranulf would later cite) was a phony collectivism, “under the super-
vision of the pedantocracy of the Sorbonne. M. Durkheim dissolved, 
with his grave dialectic, the idea of nation. He demanded the abolition 
of inheritance. He advocated the development of professional guilds, 
but on the basis of a pure democracy incompatible with the vigor and 
seriousness of this institution.”102
By upholding the chimera of a community attained by means 
of anarchy, Durkheim actually served only one community—that of 
cosmopolitan “Jewish nationalism,” which would flourish, Lasserre 
warned, even as France decayed.103 This, not patriotism, was what 
inspired Durkheim’s “insolent carnival of false science.”104
A Benedictine monk, Dom Besse, who was also an Action Française 
stalwart, took Lasserre’s argument further. Rather than resting con-
tent with the implication that Durkheim worked towards Jewish rule, 
Besse said this directly.105 “Agathon,” the pseudonym for one of Gabriel 
Tarde’s sons and a collaborator, had taken a step on this path in 1911, 
accusing Durkheim of “fanatisme autoritaire” and “despotisme intellec-
tuelle.”106 But this was a charge of mandarin elitism, not, á la Besse, a 
full-throated blast of paranoia.
Besse begins with a roll call of infamy—“Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, 
Bouglé” and others (“all Jews”) who form the nucleus of an intellec-
tual and financial elite.107 Like Agathon and Lasserre, Besse engages 
Durkheim and French sociology with a far greater show of scholarship 
than Svend Ranulf or Marion Mitchell.108 But he also makes no effort 
to conceal his antisemitic conspiracism. This makes him one of the very 
first critics to accuse Durkheim of an effectively protofascist taste for 
hegemony. And while naïfs like Ranulf and Mitchell were inclined to 
doubt that Durkheim’s autoritaire impulses were conscious, Besse is 
not so generous.
To be sure, Besse himself is not a liberal democrat. But as a 
Maurassian monarchist, he is profoundly offended by Durkheim’s wish 
to replace traditional hierarchy with what he imagines would be an 
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anti-traditional hierarchy. He thus opens Chapter 14, “M. Durkheim 
at the Sorbonne,” on a dark, conspiratorial note: “He presides over . . . 
social science, which reigns in the Ministry of Public Instruction. He is 
a man apart. He is the agent, in our official teaching, of the oligarchy 
which dictates its wishes to French democracy. Its action is not confined 
to the Sorbonne or to the direction of higher and secondary education. 
It extends to the General Confederation of Labor.”109
This is the despotism at the heart of democracy.110 Durkheim, the 
“Moses of sociology,” the “high priest of humanity,” wields a magnetic 
influence, placing “reason in lethargy” and treating people like pup-
pets. His objective is to place a reconstructed humanity above God and 
under the sway of cosmopolitan Jews and Protestant liberals. This is a 
hideous fate, but in “democracy” it is also inevitable. Hence Besse fears 
the worst. “Dreyfus will be rehabilitated.” Every supernatural influence 
will be extirpated. The sages of the Sorbonne will complete their moral 
invasion of France and educate the next generation of “educators of 
democracy.”111
In other words, democracy is a ruse, a cover for demagogues; 
and sociology in the form of Durkheim’s social realism is its accom-
plice. “Democracy and social realism are . . . two myths which support 
each other mutually.”112 And farther behind the curtain, we find Jewish 
supremacism and socialism: “M. Durkheim is a Jew, we must not forget 
that. His race dominates him.”113 Durkheim conquered sociology to 
disfigure it. In this he serves his fellow Jewish socialists: “They began 
before Karl Marx and they will continue after him. By . . . their finan-
cial power [they seek] a social, political and industrial basis for their 
neo-messianism.”114
This vision is anti-Durkheimian not only politically but sociolog-
ically. Besse’s premise is pure crowd psychology, á la Tarde, but rather 
than naming Drumont as the inspirateur of the misguided crowd he 
singles out Durkheim, the anti-Drumont.115 This is not a coincidence, 
since Action Française publicists often made it a point of honor to 
defend Tarde. “The profound and brilliant Tarde” was right, Lasserre 
wrote, to ignore Durkheim’s “ridiculous” objections and give Great 
Men the credit they deserve for their “eminent part in the formation of 
manners and public opinion.”116 But ironically, these “great men” were 
now conceived as Jewish deceivers, who must be exposed and resisted. 
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That was what Dom Besse and Pierre Lasserre attempted, and in that 
attempt they were fully in line with Action Française policy, which piv-
oted around resistance to manipulation by Jewish usurpers.
The Action Française slogan in this period, Maurras reminisced in 
1931, could have taken this very simple form: “Shut up, you insolent 
Jew! Here comes the King!”117 Eight years later, his newspaper cele-
brated the fact that Lévy-Bruhl had fallen silent, at last. 
sociology disfigured?
Ivan Strenski is one of Svend Ranulf’s sharpest critics. About his main 
anti-Durkheimian claims, Strenski writes sternly: “This is unadulterated 
rubbish. Most critics have treated Ranulf far too gently. Perhaps, after 
nearly 70 years, it is time to take off the gloves?” He follows this rebuke 
with several pertinent objections, one of which is that “Ranulf never 
cites a single instance of any fascist who ever claims to have been so 
influenced by Durkheim.”118 But, as it happens, Marcel Déat is precisely 
such a fascist. And Déat differs from his Action Française precursors in 
his wish to claim Durkheim’s mantle for fascism.
Where Besse et al. had recoiled from sociology’s democratic 
reformism, Déat claims Durkheim for the very antithesis of democracy 
and reform. On the occasion of Lévy-Bruhl’s death in 1939, he took a 
stance very different from that of the bellicose Action Française: “The 
ideas of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl have been perfectly confirmed by 
totalitarianism,” Déat declared. “The sociologists, if there are any still 
around, should never forget it.”119
Déat was well aware, of course, that many sociologists, including 
Mauss, were still very much on the scene. But he was bent on claiming 
Durkheim’s legacy for himself and fascism.120 An influential socialist pol-
itician in the 1920s and a one-time protégé of Durkheim’s colleague 
Célestin Bouglé, Déat had begun his odyssey to the neo-Nazi right in 
his book Perspectives socialistes (1930), in which he upheld a techno-
cratic planisme against social democracy.121 Déat’s wish to claim sociol-
ogy as the ground for his break with socialism, and with Bouglé, was 
already evident, leading the youthful Claude Levi-Strauss, writing in 
L’Étudiant socialiste (1931), to condemn Durkheim as well as Déat for 
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supposedly transcendentalizing society.122 Mauss was given an inscribed 
copy of Déat’s book,123 and he probaby knew that, by 1942, Déat was 
rallying “totalitarian” support for the collaborationist Vichy regime 
against alleged Jewish betrayal.124 But he was still “disconcerted,” Battini 
reports, when, that same year, Déat wrote: “We are on the threshold of 
community life. Heroism is not only courage on the battlefield but also 
devotion to the common interest, the feeling that the individual is not 
complete unless he is integrated in a group and that he is nothing unless 
he is willing to devote himself to society and to sacrifice himself for it.”125
This sentiment more closely resembles the “idealistic” Nazi wish to 
mock death and the devil that Ranulf found in Abel’s book than it does 
Durkheim’s sociology of collegiality. But Battini, who evidently does not 
see the difference, cites Déat’s memoirs as further evidence of his fidelity 
to Durkheim. Here the nimble fascist links Durkheim’s “idea of national 
solidarity” to his own desire for the “complete reintegration of the indi-
vidual in a society where he breathes—in a certain sense—the same air 
as in a family community. And—let’s admit it—with something of that 
intense warmth which the sociologists discovered in the primitive clan.”126
Déat thus plays the Ranulfian card. Readers who know little about 
Durkheim’s views of clan culture can be forgiven for assuming that con-
fident assertions like this one might have merit. But Battini also thinks 
that Maurras “was surprisingly in tune” with Durkheim vis-à-vis colle-
gial associations and the renewal of solidarity.127 Maurras himself knew 
better. In the booklet Battini cites, L’idée de décentralisation (1898), 
Maurras argues that a truly autoritaire state, one capable of ostraciz-
ing Dreyfus and his liberal allies once and for all, must reserve central 
authority for the French state and military and grant cultural autonomy 
to the provinces.128 Maurras dedicated his book “to the officers of the 
general staff of the FRENCH ARMY, defamed by the enemies of the 
state,” and he echoed Ernest Judet, the editor of the Petit Journal,129 
who had recently said that “centralization, established to increase the 
State’s forces, had [actually] enervated those national forces.”130 Judet 
had “observed that, in the Dreyfus Affair, the State, so formidable 
against all private initiatives, had found itself unable to defend its mili-
tary and judicial prerogatives.”131 To win back popular fealty, the state 
must stop micro-managing the provinces and draw strength from the 
loyalties and energies that would flourish regionally as a result. This 
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regionalism would draw together the variegated threads in the tapestry 
of French culture and would thus strengthen rather than weaken the 
French state and military.
Maurras drew inspiration for this proposal to strengthen autocracy 
by federalist means from the novel Les Déracinés (1897) by his friend 
and comrade Maurice Barrès. It was Barrès who popularized the idea 
that energie nationale can spring from the revival of the unique heri-
tages of “earth and death” (la terres et les morts) found in the regions. 
Maurras saw immediately that unsuspecting readers might number 
Barrès “among the anarchists.”132 But that, he said with understated 
irony, would be “inexact.”133 Barrès was an authoritarian who believed 
not in the individual, but in the stream of national tradition that car-
ries individuals along. Very few empirical people are ever truly “per-
sonalities” in the Barrèsiste sense. Only “at long intervals,” Maurras 
explained, and among exceptional figures is personality found in “the 
human soul.” That is why it is necessary, against the teachings of anar-
chism, for the anonymous masses to submit to the state.134
Unlike Durkheim, Maurras argued that hope for the future lies 
not in resurrected guilds (which were uniformly called “corporations” 
in French texts), but in the state. “In the . . . disorganized nation,” he 
writes, “the State alone has a privilege analogous to the corporations of 
the past.”135 But that privilege is rusting, and must be revived. Currently, 
he writes, “all the civil servants, even the judges and the priests,” have 
been stripped of the nimbus of authority. Only “a single group of officials 
must be excepted from the rule, for it has been systematically enfran-
chised and forms in the State a solid and powerful State . . .” This group 
he portrays as a kind of deep state, ruling from behind the scenes because 
the true state has been hollowed out: “It is the cadre of educators.” 
Sounding much like his future disciples Besse and Lasserre, Maurras adds 
darkly: “The tightly-knit members of this body draw their influence from 
the disunity of the French. [The educational community exerts] influ-
ence without counterweight, since there is no other legal corporation. 
In a country where everyone is “uprooted” [déracinén] they grow roots 
and branches. I find it significant that, with the exception of two or three 
free spirits, these gentlemen have received Les Déracinés as enemies, and 
have not even conceded the interest of the thesis or the beauty of the 
work.”136
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How beautiful is the work? One detail will suffice for present pur-
poses. Sturel, the protagonist, is one of seven free-floating young men 
from the eastern province of Lorraine who find themselves perturbed 
by their loss of rooted identity while studying with a Kantian academic 
in Paris. Sturel becomes romantically involved with a stereotypically 
exotic Armenian woman, Astiné Aravian, who in a deeply disturbing 
scene is brutally attacked by two assailants, who bludgeon her and ulti-
mately decapitate her. When Sturel discovers that the killers are also 
from Lorraine, and that they are unknown to the police, he is faced with 
the Barrèsiste version of a moral dilemma. Should he report them to 
the authorities? He decides, in a gesture of regional solidarity, to allow 
Astiné’s hideous murder to go unavenged. Bonds of earth and death 
matter more than ideals of legal justice.137
Maurras knew that this vision, which the untutored might con-
fuse with anti-authoritarianism, was anathema to democrats, however 
community-minded. Liberal educators were the last people he would 
count upon to befriend Barrès or betray Dreyfus. Intellectuals like 
Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl might steer a course between pure individu-
alism and collectivism, but they were enemies of reaction. Battini, in his 
effort to identify Durkheim with Maurras and Déat, thus falls into the 
very trap against which Pierre Lasserre had warned.138 As Lasserre and 
others knew in their bones, Durkheim was not one of them, but was, in 
fact, an enemy. Saying otherwise may have served Déat’s purposes, but 
Action Française knew better.
words have consequences
Marcel Déat was an outlier. As Desan and Heilbron have shown, he was 
atypical of the 22 younger Durkheimians they studied, most of whom 
remained on the left in the fascist era. Several fought in the anti-fascist 
resistance and at least two (Valentin Feldman and Anatole Lewitzky) 
died for the anti-fascist cause.139
Desan and Heilbron are also puzzled by Stoetzler’s return to 
Ranulf. Is it really plausible, they ask, to infer that “by even addressing 
the same questions as nineteenth-century antisemitic discourse (e.g., 
the rise of egotistical utilitarianism and the moral dislocations of modern 
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society)” that “classical sociology, including the Durkheimian tradition, 
unwittingly disarmed itself in the face of antisemitism and fascism?”140
This brings us back to Stoetzler, who hoped to “complicate” 
Ranulf’s thesis. This ambition led him in two directions. On the one 
hand, he shows considerable sensitivity to Durkheim’s humanistic 
tendencies, offering a generous assessment of his liberal activism and 
motives; and yet, at the same time, he significantly deepens and extends 
Ranulf’s thesis by attempting to link Durkheim to antisemitism as well as 
fascism.141 He does this mainly by a symptomatic reading of Durkheim’s 
language, with respect, most notably, to Herbert Spencer.
Durkheim “developed a discourse that aimed at defending liberal 
society and modernization,” Stoetzler says, “while at the same time 
attacking a caricature of [Spencer’s] ‘egotistical utilitarianism’. . . . 
[Durkheim opposed] but also mimicked the discourse of the antisem-
ites, even when . . . explicitly opposing antisemitism.”142 This is a grave 
accusation, which Stoetzler does little to document or even clarify. By 
what criterion would a frontal assault on antisemitism qualify as “mim-
ickry” of radical antisemitism, and by what criteria would such mimickry 
count as evidence of antisemitism? Rather than addressing these ques-
tions squarely, Stoetzler offers a sampler of what he sees as telltale phras-
ing. In one place, for example, he writes that Durkheim “calls utilitarian 
individualism ‘a ferment of moral dissolution’ (a choice of words that 
is rather close to a conservative, typically antisemitic critique of modern 
society)”143 Elsewhere he says that Durkheim’s comments on archaic 
Jewish traditionalism resemble the views of “the radical antisemites” on 
“Jews as symbols of the old regime.”144 And still elsewhere he argues 
mainly by analogy: “antisemites . . . engage in a not entirely dissimilar 
project: trashing a straw man called Spencer or some equivalent and 
proposing a scheme of collective morality or quasi-religion.”145
None of this is enlightening, or credible. We have seen what 
antisemites say about Jews. Saying that a stray phrase is “rather close” 
to antisemitic language or that Durkheim’s project of social criticism 
and reform is “not entirely dissimilar” from criticisms and reforms 
pursued by antisemites does not get us very far.146 Nor does it help to 
accuse him, without credible psychological evidence, of acting from the 
same impulses that drove an arch-antisemite like Edouard Drumont. 
Stoetzler, who opens with an epigram from Drumont,147 asserts with 
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little obvious evidence or logic that “Durkheim seems to have been 
driven to caricature and demonize Spencer . . . by the same impulse that 
drove the antisemites.”148
Seems; the same; demonize?149 Those are frail claims, and I see 
no reason to accept them.150 Stoetzler’s attempt to defend his elabora-
tion of Ranulf’s thesis on epistemic grounds, meanwhile, is no stronger. 
“Some readers will object that Durkheim’s corporations are not the cor-
porations proposed by the fascists—that Durkheim intended a different 
meaning . . .” Calling this objection “banal” and “über-historicizing,” 
Stoetzler offers a reply in advance: “Part of what [the classical sociolo-
gists] actually said is also what others, at the time and later, thought they 
said.”151
I think not. By that logic, Durkheim would share the blame for 
every careless reading, for every incompetent translation, for every 
honest or dishonest reading inspired by jealousy, careerism or polit-
ical hostility, now and in the future. Everything said about him by 
Agathon, Besse, Déat, Lasserre, Mitchell, and Ranulf could be laid at 
this doorstep, no matter how radically or capriciously any of these writ-
ers may stray from the letter or spirit of his text. Even worse is the 
license this hermeneutic principle would give to prejudices and stereo-
types: “[u]nconventional thinking often suffers the indignity of being 
mistaken for conventional thinking. This is especially true when socio-
logical realism and other forms of anti-reductionism are at stake, since, 
in many spheres, anti-reductionism is so far from conventional that, 
when unsuspecting observers encounter it, they often confuse it with 
reductionism.”152
In strictly literary terms Durkheim is hard to misread. Unlike 
Marx, who never taught, or Weber, who taught for only a few years, 
Durkheim was a gifted life-long pedagogue who wrote with didactic 
precision. But his ideas are hard to assimilate because they are very far 
from conventional. Studying Les formes élémentaires or Le suicide for the 
first time can be a wrenching experience, because these books challenge 
the reader at every step. Each chapter, relentlessly, pulls the reader far-
ther from the gravity of conventional thought. Durkheim may be right 
or wrong, but he is seldom if ever shallow or trite.153
Svend Ranulf and Michele Battini and almost every other writer 
who has been reviewed in this article has had something to say about 
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Durkheim’s views on so-called “corporations.” This theme is, in fact, 
only a thread in the larger tapestry of Durkheim’s thought, which 
encompasses a very wide range of concerns. But it is also central to his 
agenda, and deserves our attention. 
guild sociology and The fuTure of solidariTy
In 1893, when Durkheim’s study of the social division of labor first 
appeared, the start of l’affaire Dreyfus was just months away. Much of 
what Durkheim had to say in that book was directly relevant to the 
turbulence that shook France in the ensuing years, but it was in Le sui-
cide, in 1897, that he delved most deeply into the ulterior causes of 
the “morbid effervescence” which, despite the “brilliancy” of modern 
social advances, cast a long shadow over modernity.154 The past had 
been worse, and could not be revived. Industrial and technical advance 
would continue. But would that advance be progressive?
That question was central to the neglected final chapter of Le suicide, 
entitled “Practical Consequences.” It was in this chapter that Durkheim 
first mapped the possibility of renewing social cohesion on a new founda-
tion, “the “corporation”—that is, the group made up “of all workers of 
the same sort, in association, all who cooperate in the same function, that 
is, the occupational group or corporation.”155 In fin de siècle France, the 
word “corporation” referred not to modern businesses but to medieval 
guilds, small enterprises that united masters and journeymen in shared 
face-to-face pursuits. Modern capitalism, as depicted by Durkheim, was 
bereft of any institutions that could provide a similar ground for healthy 
social integration. The modern administrative state is too remote from 
daily life and should not, in any event, be entrusted with excessive power 
over civil society. Religions hold critical thinking in abeyance, which, 
given the irreversibility of modern trends, is no longer a long-term option. 
Families are scattering to the winds, and even the ideal of “the nation” 
can only inspire and unite people in exceptional moments.
The beauty of the guilde nouvelle is that it would unite people 
without dividing them at the same time. Unity on the basis of national-
ity is also division on the basis of nationality. But new professional guilds 
would unite people on the basis of shared activities and values, within 
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the framework of the larger division of labor; and that division of labor 
would unite them globally, organically, complexly, as specialized units 
within the larger universe of entwined collectives. The bonds between 
co-workers and collectives would have to be voluntary, since “solidar-
ity” ordered by the state would be morbid—it would force a simulation 
of cooperation without evoking a spirit of cooperation.
The malaise that Durkheim hoped to overcome had two pri-
mary aspects: egoism and anomie. Neither of these terms were used by 
Durkheim in the usual contemporary sense. Both, for example, were 
defined subjectively and objectively. “Egoism” is not simply the selfish-
ness or self-absorption that readers have often assumed was an object of 
moral censure for Durkheim. It is, on the contrary, an objective con-
dition of isolation, of social detachment, that makes people feel lost 
and lonely, not simply, or necessarily, narcissistic. So too, anomie is an 
objective condition of normlessness, of separation from group values and 
guidance. Like egoism, anomie is seldom embraced; it is, rather, expe-
rienced, as a kind of fate. And the experience of anomie is at least as 
disorienting and disturbing as it is liberating.
Durkheim was equally opposed to excessive regulation and integra-
tion (egoism and altruism) and their opposites, anomie and fatalism. He 
hoped to see balance and cooperation in the relations between nations, 
classes and individuals. His concern, in the 1915 pamphlet Deutschland 
über alles, was to better understand the anomie of nations, which had 
reached extreme heights in wartime Germany.156 Why was Germany so 
avid to achieve radical autarky? Why did German statecraft, influenced 
by Treitschkean statism, pursue unbridled supremacy über alles? Why 
was the German military so willing and eager to flout all recognized 
international norms in pursuit of goals of morbid enormity?
Hyper-nationalism, viewed from this perspective, is precisely the 
kind of unbridled national self-assertion that Durkheim sought to 
understand and undo. He hoped to promote amity between nations 
in place of anomie. A similar motive was at work in the preface to the 
second edition of De la division sociale de travail (1902), which is, for 
most readers, the locus classicus of his corporation doctrine.157 Here his 
hope is to cure the “sickness” in the relations between classes, which 
he attributes to the “legal and moral anomie” that prevails between 
“employers and office workers, industrial workers and factory bosses, 
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industrialists in competition with one another [and] industrialists and 
the public.” In these knotted relations, he says, we see few signs of 
the kind of moral consensus that would be needed to ensure mutu-
ally supportive relations. Instead, we hear only vague truisms about 
“employee loyalty and employer moderation,” unfair competition and 
consumer exploitation.158 What Marx had characterized as the “anarchy 
in production” is now given a moral dimension.159 “It is to this state of 
anomie that [we must attribute] the continually recurring conflicts and 
disorders of every kind of which the economic world affords so sorry 
a spectacle,” and which, morally unconstrained, “tend to grow beyond 
all bounds . . .”160 Durkheim is insistent that effective lasting barriers to 
conflict can only be moral. “Men’s passions are only stayed by a moral 
presence they respect. If all authority of this kind is lacking, it is the law 
of the strongest that rules, and a state of warfare, either latent or acute, 
is necessarily endemic.”161
That, unfortunately, is precisely the situation in contemporary 
class relations. Since “unions of employers and . . . employees . . . lack 
a common organization to unite them without causing them to lose 
their individuality . . . it is . . . the law of the strongest that decides any 
disputes, and a state of out-and-out warfare prevails.”162 In this state of 
warfare abuses are common. These abuses can be avoided only if society 
takes action to ensure that the strong do not exploit the weak or “fetter” 
their liberty.
Action of this kind to overcome anomie must be taken within civil 
society, since “the state . . . cannot discharge this function.” Often in 
the past “dependence on the state swiftly degenerated into . . . intoler-
able servitude.”163 And activity in any specialized field can be effectively 
regulated only by those who know its operations and needs intimately. 
“The only group that meets these conditions” consists of “all those 
working in the same industry, assembled together . . . in a single body. 
This is what is termed a corporation, or professional group. The sole 
groups that have a certain permanence are . . . today called unions, 
either of employers or workers. . . . This represents the beginning . . . 
though still in a rudimentary . . . form.”164
It would be naïve to think that “the ancient corporation as it existed 
in the Middle Ages” can be revived artificially.165 What is needed rather 
is a guild that serves the material interests of its members, as unions do 
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now, without forgetting its higher purpose. Such a guild would be capa-
ble of “nurturing among workers a more invigorated feeling of their 
common solidarity, and preventing the law of the strongest from being 
applied too brutally in industrial . . . relationships.”166
What Durkheim is envisioning here is plainly a form of Social 
Democracy. Like Bernstein and other mild socialists among his con-
temporaries, he advocates a kind of self-management via class collab-
oration. He wants to see associations built on a trans-local scale, to 
unite everyone who can collaborate on the basis of shared professional 
interests. But he wants these associations to operate by elections and 
local autonomy at every level. This requires “elected assemblies [which] 
include representatives of employees and employers,” not only at the 
highest national and governing levels but also at the lower levels, to 
ensure that everyone is shielded from the worst effects of hierarchy and 
competition.167
Ultimately, what Durkheim wants above all is an antidote to ego-
ism and anomie. Hence the new guilds must therefore strike a bal-
ance between excessive integration and legislation and their absence. 
Translated into human terms, that means that members should be 
incorporated into and subject to the guild’s self-regulation just enough 
to feel the collective “warmth that . . . gives fresh life to each individual 
. . . causing selfishness to melt away.”168 This, in turn, entails a further 
role for the guilds, to serve as community centers: “we now already see 
trade unions acting at the same time as friendly societies, and others are 
setting up communal centers where courses are organized, and concerts 
and dramatic performances held.”169
Finally, Durkheim wants the guilds to serve as the groundwork 
for a political system which, to my ears, sounds Jeffersonian, rising on 
the foundation of a matrix of decentralized local assemblies. “A soci-
ety made up of an extremely large mass of unorganized individuals,” 
he writes, “which an overgrown state attempts to limit and restrain, 
[is] a veritable sociological monstrosity.”170 Infinitely better would be a 
system in which the guild “will be called upon to become the founda-
tion, or one of the essential foundations, of our political organization. 
May we not legitimately think that the corporation should [become] the 
basic political unit? Society, instead of [being a collection] of juxtaposed 
landmasses—would become a vast system of national corporations 
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[with] electoral colleges . . . constituted by professions and not by ter-
ritorial constituencies.”171
This is not the whole of what Durkheim proposes, since he knows 
that many important social reforms can only be accomplished at the 
international and national level. His social democratic goals, in partic-
ular, require legislative action at the level of the state. The professional 
guild is not “a kind of cure-all which can serve any purpose. The crisis 
from which we are suffering does not stem from one single, unique 
cause. For it to be dispelled, it is not enough to establish some kind of 
regulatory system . . . the system should also be fair.”172 At this point, 
he cites a passage that occurs later in the book: “If one class in soci-
ety is obliged, in order to live, to secure the acceptance by others of 
its services . . . the latter group can lord it over the former. In other 
words, there can be no rich and poor by birth without their being unjust 
contracts.”173
Durkheim believes that equal opportunity should be guaranteed; 
that inheritance should not determine anyone’s fate. The abolition of 
inheritance would thus be an immense leap forward: “Let us suppose 
that the overriding consideration of ideal justice has been finally real-
ized, that [children] begin their lives in a state of perfect economic 
equality, that is, that wealth has completely ceased to be hereditary.”174 
But achieving even this, one of the cherished ideals of socialism, would 
not be enough. Inequality would diminish but anomie and egoism 
would persist; solidarity would not have been reconstituted: “[t]he 
problems with which we are now grappling would not thereby have 
been resolved. . . . Merely because wealth will not be handed down 
according to the same principles as at the present time, the state of 
anarchy will not have disappeared.”175
This is why Durkheim considers it necessary to think beyond the 
state. Anomie and egoism will flourish in the interstices of society, in 
everyday life, if we do not construct new means of solidarity. That is 
why he believes that, “although the problem of the corporation is not 
the only one that imposes itself upon public attention, there is certainly 
none more pressing . . . ”176
It would be easy to fault Durkheim’s guild sociology on many 
grounds. How could private ownership of the major modern corpora-
tions persist without inheritance? Why would these behemoths not join 
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the ranks of “corporations” in the reconstituted sense of guild democ-
racy? Why would society want to preserve private ownership of the 
engines or production which society depends upon for its very survival? 
Why would society restrain, but not eliminate, brutality and enmity 
between classes?
Many other questions can be raised. But this is a serious and imagi-
native attempt to envision a path from anomie and egoism to new forms 
of cooperation. The events of the storm-tossed twentieth century have 
dimmed hopes for this kind of transition. But Durkheim’s work was a 
beacon in the darkening skies. His ideas continue to matter because they 
continue to shed light on the prospects before us. Let us hope that the 
century to come will offer better chances for free association, profes-
sional and civic, and for effective resistance to fascism.
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